This paper argues that procedural and substantive approaches to democracy fail to address the question of the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime. Taking Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron as a point of departure, the paper contends that procedural and substantive democrats approach democracy at the level of daily governance as if it exhausted the democratic ideal. As a result, they not only ignore democracy at the level of the fundamental laws but the question of democratic legitimacy altogether. After examining the under-theorized distinction between these two dimensions of the democratic ideal, the paper builds on the work of Sheldon Wolin and argues that democracy at the level of the fundamental laws should be conceived as a moment in the life of a polity, the moment in which ordinary citizens deliberate and exercise their power to (re)constitute the juridical order and legitimate their constitution. By way of conclusion, the article considers some of the mechanisms contained in new Latin American constitutions as examples of devices that might facilitate the practice of the second dimension of democracy.
INTRODUCTION
Someone who tries to defend the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime usually puts forward either one of two kinds of claims. She may point towards the ways in which the regime's laws and institutions are consistent with a particular interpretation of the principle of the ‗rule by the people'. For instance, if these laws and institutions give citizens equal treatment and allow them to participate in everyday decision-making, she might plausibly defend that regime on democratic grounds. But she can also take a different route and argue that the regime's laws and institutions are the result of what is thought to be a democratic procedure (e.g. a legislature that functions according to the principle of majority rule), and that this is sufficient to maintain their democratic legitimacy. The first of these approaches can be identified as ‗substantive' and the second as ‗procedural'.
In this paper, I argue that these approaches to democracy not only do not have much to say about the question of democratic legitimacy, but that they tend to negate or at least obscure that question.
When scrutinized from a democratic perspective, the problem with these approaches is that they fail to distinguish between the two dimensions of democracy. The first dimension of democracy, democracy at the level of daily governance (democratic governance), has to do with the adoption of ordinary laws and the administration of a state's bureaucratic apparatus; the second, democracy at the level of the fundamental laws, with the relation of the people 1 to their constitution. 2 As will become clear later, I believe that this second dimension is directly connected to the question of democratic legitimacy: to defend the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime is to say that it is compatible with the exercise of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws.
To present this argument, I will first examine the work of two selfproclaimed democrats, Jeremy Waldron and Ronald Dworkin, the former a proceduralist and the latter a substantivist. I then introduce the distinction between democratic governance and democracy at the level of the fundamental laws and examine the treatment they receive in Waldron's and Dworkin's theories. I will
show that their conceptions of democracy operate only within the level of 1 In using the category of ‗the people', it is not my intention to appeal to a sort of collective entity capable of expressing a single, unitary will. I use this category simply to refer to the human beings recognized as citizens in a determinate territorial extension. Although all citizens of a contemporary society cannot come together, deliberate and make a decision about the content of their constitution, they can participate in the positing and re-positing of the fundamental laws through the use of different mechanisms of popular participation. 2 One could also add democracy at the level of society (e.g. democracy in the workplace) as a third dimension and democracy at the international level as a fourth. This, of course, is out of the scope of this paper.
contained and embodied in a constitution (democracy always escapes constitutionalization). Democracy, on the contrary, is approached as a political practice that involves the manifestation of popular sovereignty. In that sense, what in the context of democratic governance is seen as a threat to juridical stability and to the very idea of law, appears as the natural consequence of democracy and as a corollary of the idea of democratic legitimacy. Finally, I briefly consider some of the mechanisms contained in new Latin American constitutions as examples of devices that might facilitate the practice of the second dimension of democracy.
THE SUBSTANTIVE AND THE PROCEDURAL APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY
The difference between proceduralists and substantivists is usually posed in terms of their approach to the relationship between rights and majority rule. 3 What separates procedural from substantive democrats is that the former tend to stress the importance of having a fair process for making decisions about controversial moral issues. Proceduralists defend majority rule as such a process because it respects the equal status of citizens. 4 Any realistic alternative to majority rule, they
WALDRON THE PROCEDURALIST
One of the most well known procedural democrats is Jeremy Waldron.
Waldron's critique of judicial review of legislation (probably the most important component of his intellectual project) rests on a conception of democracy that privileges procedure over substance. This does not mean that Waldron believes that the content of fundamental and ordinary laws is not important or that rights protection should be moved to a secondary plane, but that to inquire into the democratic legitimacy of laws is to ask who made them and by what procedures they came into existence: the legitimacy of laws is a matter of their pedigree. 8 For
Waldron, people have a right to participate in equal terms in all aspects of their community's governance, that is, not just in interstitial matters of social and economic policy but also in decisions of high principle.
9
The right to participate--the right of rights‖ 10 as Waldron calls it following
William Cobbett-is connected to values (such as autonomy and responsibility) that are part of the liberal commitment to other basic liberties. When the right to political participation is violated, our respect for other rights is called into question. 11 Ordinary individuals are seen as competent judges on issues of rights, 5 Ibid., p. 27. For an examination of the implications and limits of proceduralism, 10 Ibid., p. 232. 11 Ibid., p. 213.
democracy procedural and what drives his understanding of rights and his critique of judicial review. A theorist that holds a result-oriented or substantivist approach to democracy would answer that question in a very different way. This theorist would say, for example, that even when it is the people's rights which are at stake, it is better to entrust a body of jurists with the authority to decide what those rights require. According to that theorist, our priority should be to design the institutions that tend to produce the best decisions about rights, and a court, he might argue, is better equipped to engage in those decisions than a legislative assembly. He might also say that this kind of institution (e.g. a court with the power of judicial review) is not necessarily inconsistent with democracy; on the contrary, judicial review is nothing but an important component of a constitution that was adopted (or would have been adopted) by the free decision of a rational and informed people. 
DWORKIN THE SUBSTANTIVIST
The main tenet of Waldron's theory is that there is a loss to democracy every time a non-democratic institution 17 imposes a decision on the citizenry, no matter 12 Ibid., p. 251. 13 Ibid., p. 232. 14 , looks for the democratic legitimacy of a regime in the content of its fundamental laws and institutions. His favored interpretation of the democratic ideal, the partnership view, qualifies the relationship between majority rule and democracy. 22 Here, democracy does not mean that the majority should always or even most of the time have the final word.
What democracy requires is that the people govern themselves by treating legislature deserves to be characterized as a ‗democratic institution' and its decisions naturally enjoy democratic legitimacy. As I will argue later, although this might be true with regards to democratic governance, it becomes problematic in the context of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws. 18 Nevertheless, this does not give any reason to think that majorities should be allowed to alter, whenever they wish, the basic constitutional structure that seems ‗best calculated' to ensure equal concern: -We may better protect equal concern by embedding certain individual rights in a constitution that is to be interpreted by judges rather than by elected representatives, and then providing that the constitution can be amended only by supermajorities‖ 27 . Under this view, a democratically legitimate regime is one whose officials are elected under procedures that allow a majority of the people to replace them at regular intervals and that -by and large‖ treats individuals with equal concern. 28 An illegitimate regime is one that cannot even defend its policies as failed (but good faith) attempts to show equal concern to every individual from which it claims obedience.
THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRACY
The previous discussion showed the contrast between procedural and substantive democracy and the ways in which a democrat from each persuasion addresses the question of the democratic legitimacy of a country's laws and institutions. In Dworkin's substantive account, the question seems to be exhausted by the very idea of partnership democracy: an elected government that by and large treats people with equal concern enjoys sufficient legitimacy. For Waldron, the procedural democrat, legitimacy requires that the regime's laws are adopted by the More specifically, democratic governance has to do with the daily workings of a state's juridical apparatus, with the processes that result in the adoption of the ordinary laws and policies, and with the content of the fundamental laws. Thus, for example, most claims that judicial review is undemocratic are made at the level of democratic governance. These claims usually stress the fact that judicial review leaves important decisions in the hands of judges, and that democratic principles require that legislatures, as the duly representatives of the people, be the ones called to make those decisions. 31 The processes through which ordinary laws and policies emerge are also a matter of this first dimension of democracy, and the composition and representative nature of legislatures is the main focus of the kind of critiques that address these processes. 32 For instance, an unelected upper house In this dimension of democracy, nevertheless, the democratic ideal of popular participation can only be realized in limited ways. For practical reasons, the role of the different mechanisms that facilitate popular participation (e.g. constituent assemblies and referendums) must be limited in day to day governance and, as a result, representative institutions and bureaucrats must assume a central role. 
DEMOCRACY AT THE LEVEL OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS
The A constitution, then, might enjoy or lack democratic legitimacy with regards to the moment it was created: it can be born democratically or undemocratically.
That is to say, it can be the result of an exercise of popular sovereignty, or it can be imposed from the top down (even if by a philosophically gifted political agent). To say that the second dimension of democracy involves an exercise of popular sovereignty is not to say that democracy is exhausted by popular sovereignty (an exercise of popular sovereignty can in fact abolish democracy), but that it requires its affirmation in the context of the relationship between the constitution and those subjected to the constitutional order.
In terms of constitutional change, the second dimension of democracy is equally demanding. It is incompatible with the Lycurgian-constitutionalist obsession with permanence (with the idea of a ‗perpetual constitution', as Thomas Jefferson put it) 38 and with the insistence in the closure of the political terrain after a 37 The ideals of popular sovereignty and democratic openness are directly related to the principle of the ‗rule by the people', democracy's literal meaning. To say that the people rule themselves is to say that they are a ‗self-governing' people: a group of human beings that come together as political equals and give themselves the laws that will regulate the institutions under which they live. As noted above, this is nothing but an expression of the principle of popular sovereignty and it involves two important and related points. First, for these rules to be the people's own, it must be today's people who rule, not past generations, however wise or well-intentioned their act of constitution-making was, or whatever the content of the provisions they adopted. Taking seriously the distinction between the two dimensions of democracy would increase the opportunities for episodes of popular constitutional change, and therefore strengthen democracy at the level of the fundamental laws. Nevertheless, it could be argued that this distinction is nothing but artificial and disempoweringthat any true democratic project should attempt to blur the differences between the 41 A similar critique can be advanced against Akhil Reed Amar's theory of constitutional change. Amar maintains that -Congress would be obliged to call a convention to propose amendments if a majority of Americans so petition; and that an amendment could be lawfully ratified by a simple majority of the American electorate‖. Why or how such a petition would ever take place, and if the participation of citizens would extend beyond voting in a referendum, is very unclear (Akhil Reed Amar, -Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment‖: 89, n. 
IGNORING THE SECOND DIMENSION OF DEMOCRACY
Now that I have examined the distinction between the two dimensions of democracy it is time to show that the substantive and procedural approaches discussed in the first section not only lack a proper account of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws, but tend to negate it or at least obscure it. In Dworkin's partnership view, which I previously identified as a substantive approach to the democratic ideal, there is hardly any room for the second dimension of democracy and its emphasis on openness and popular participation in constitutional change. That is to say, by setting the traditional content of a liberal constitution as its precondition, the partnership view makes the question of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws simply irrelevant. This means that in Dworkin's partnership democracy all that matters is democracy at the level of governance, and even there it fails in meeting the demands of the democratic ideal. 45 All that the partnership view has to say about democracy at the level of the fundamental laws is that it is exhausted by the right content; the only objective of such a conception is to ensure the adoption of an ‗exemplary' constitution, a constitution whose provisions meet 45 Unless one shares Dworkin's limited conception of participation-that is, -voting and holding office‖-neither the majoritarian nor the partnership views seem to take seriously the ideal of popular participation in government (Ronald Dworkin, supra note 21, p. 48). None of these views attempt to create institutions that maximize the participation of citizens in the processes that result in their country's laws and institutions. As a result, they deprive democracy of its defining and most threatening characteristic: the participation of citizens in the adoption of the rules that regulate their conduct. And democracy cannot merely require, as Dworkin suggests, a system that gives -the final verdict on who leads it to many millions of people‖; it must involve the affirmation of the role of ordinary citizens in the activity of governing (ibid., p. 127 (Emphasis added)). Under his view, if a constitution provides for the rights and procedures that make partnership democracy possible, it does not make sense to be concerned about who adopted it and how, or to worry about the possibility of important constitutional transformations. 47 In fact, the very idea of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws, of ordinary people meddling with the constitutional regime, is a threat to partnership democracy. That is why Dworkin, the substantive democrat, favors an amendment procedure that makes constitutional change difficult and unlikely. For him, majorities should not be allowed, -whenever they wish, to change the basic constitutional structure that seems best calculated to ensure equal concern‖ 48 . 1998) . The ‗enfeeblement of the political' occurs when, by attempting to protect society from the ‗tyranny of the majority', the sphere of democratic decision-making is shrunk to a point in which democracy comes close to becoming meaningless. 47 Someone might argue here that Dworkin's approach is entirely consistent with important constitutional transformations, in the sense that he sees the constitution as a -living‖ document, always susceptible to be interpreted in more progressive ways. I disagree with this view. On the one hand, there are certain things that can hardly be achieved by constitutional interpretation. Profound constitutional changes (including but not limited to those that deal with the basic structure of government) usually require formal amendments to the constitutional text. There is, however, another -more important -reason (on this point, see Sanford Levinson, supra note 39, p. 160).
Regardless of the limits of interpretation as a means to important constitutional transformations, the main problem with that approach is that it does not have anything to do with democracy. That is to say, constitutional interpretation is usually done by judges, and democratic constitutional change (which is the kind of change that interest me here) must take place through participatory procedures. 48 Ronald Dworkin, supra note 21, p. 144. 49 Perhaps the most famous example of this ‗model' of constitution-making is the case of Japan, whose supreme law was written by American experts and translated to Japanese during the postwar occupation 50 The problem with this view is that while it gives to the legislative assembly what it takes away from the judiciary, it comes very close to equating ‗people' with ‗legislature', thus rendering the actual participation of ordinary citizens in framing the content of the fundamental laws unnecessary. His assertion that every time that there is a disagreement about rights -the people whose rights are in question have the right to participate on equal terms in that decision‖ 51 
THE SECOND DIMENSION OF DEMOCRACY: APPROACHING THE POLITICAL
My purpose in the previous sections was not only to establish a distinction between democratic governance and democracy at the level of the fundamental laws, but to show how the latter is obscured or negated in familiar approaches to democracy. I briefly examined the kind of issues fundamental to this second dimension, as well as its emphasis on the affirmation of popular sovereignty, understood as including the ideals of popular participation and democratic openness. However, I did not consider the specific constitutional forms proper to it and there is a reason for this: democracy at the level of the fundamental laws cannot be conceived as a regime or identified with a constitution; it is, rather, a moment in the life of a democratic polity that a juridical order makes possible. In this section, building on Sheldon Wolin's democratic theory, I introduce this argument.
WOLIN'S FUGITIVE DEMOCRACY
The idea that I take from Wolin and that will be connected with my previous discussion is that of democracy (in what I call its second dimension) as a moment rather than as a form of government, a democracy that Wolin describes as fugitive ISSN 2029-0405 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 2 2009
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to emphasize its necessarily episodic and occasional character. 53 My contention, it should be clear from the beginning, is not that democracy as such is unrelated to constitutional forms. As I stated above, there are certain rights (whatever specific form the may take) that are necessary not only for democratic governance, but for the very existence of democracy. 54 What I will suggest is that democracy at the level of the fundamental laws is not a matter of entrenching basic principles, of finding the ‗most democratic form of government', but a political practice that takes place outside the confines of the established constitution (no matter how democratic this constitution might be thought to be).
To think of democracy and constitutions as naturally belonging together, as each incomplete without the other, is commonplace in contemporary societies. 55 As
Wolin suggests, it is usually assumed -that democracy is the sort of political phenomenon whose teleological or even ideological destination is a constitutional form‖ 56 . A constitutional form is a structure to which all politics should conform;
whatever falls outside it is seen as illegal, improper and anti-political. 57 That has been the destiny of modern democracy: to be fitted into constitutional forms that allow only a determinate amount of popular politics to take place. For instance, constitutions regulate the periodicity of politics and encapsulate them in ritualistic processes such as giving the ‗voice of the people' the opportunity to ‗speak' every four years in regular elections. 58 When democracy is settled into its ‗proper' form (becoming a constitutional democracy), writes Wolin, it is rendered predictable and easily becomes the object of manipulation.
59
According to the discourse of liberal constitutionalism, these constitutional forms are designed to protect democracy from itself: a democracy free of forms is synonymous with revolution, inherently instable, and has a tendency to undermine 53 Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision (Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 602. 54 Moreover, as Christopher Eisgruber has demonstrated, -[p]eople can speak only through institutions, and any sets of institutions will simultaneously enable and constrain political action‖ (Christopher L. Eisgruber, supra note 38, p. 12). In that sense, the de-constitutionalization of democracy is always partial and incomplete. In that sense, I also agree with Stephen Holmes' in that people cannot magically express their will in the absence of institutions and procedures. Nevertheless I don't think that from that it follows that the constitutional forms and institutions characterize liberal constitutionalism are necessarily consistent with the democratic ideal (as these two authors seem to suggest) (Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 166). The goal of the democrat, I argue, should be to defend and propose institutions that tend to realize democracy to the maximum degree possible, not to find ways of justifying the constitutional regimes we already have. 55 . 61 Instead of advancing a conception of constitutionalism that avoids democracy's inclination towards revolution while at the same time preserving its best features, Wolin proposes to use these very attacks as a basis for an aconstitutional democracy theory. 62 Under this conception, it is not assumed that the natural direction of democracy is towards greater institutionalization. Going beyond the emphasis on institutional arrangements in which constitutionalism has priority over democracy, Wolin invites us to think about democracy as episodically dictating the contents of a constitution and as representative of a moment in the life of a polity. 63 In his view, democracy cannot be seen as completing its task by establishing a constitutional form and then being fitted to it. 64 A constitution should not be understood as the fulfillment of democracy but as the transfiguration of the democratic ideal into a regime; and democracy is to be reconceived as a rebellious moment in which, as Wolin says, ‗the political' is remembered.
The political refers to the idea that a society composed of human beings with different world views and interests can experience moments of commonality through public deliberations, that is, political moments in which collective power is used to promote or protect the well being of society. 65 The political should be distinguished from politics, which refers to the endless struggle among organized powers (e.g. political parties) over -access to the resources available to public authorities‖ 66 . Unlike politics, which is continuous and endless, the political is episodic and rare. 67 The obstacle faced by contemporary democracies is not, as it is usually argued, that the realization of the rule by the people is incompatible with the size and complexity of modern societies. 68 The problem is that contemporary democratic theory comes accompanied by a conception of politics as a ceaseless However, this active demos does not (and should not) aspire to the taking of state power; on the contrary, it is engaged in local struggles directed at improving the lives of ordinary citizens, such as those for low-income housing, better schools and health care. 73 The demos does not seek to govern because that would require accommodating itself to bureaucratized institutions that are by their very nature hierarchical and elitist. 74 In addition, given its material conditions, and the fact that -the wealthy have purchased and nurtured political agents to govern for them‖ . In conceiving democracy as rare and episodic, however, Wolin provides us with a valuable tool to understand the practice of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws. Understanding the second dimension of democracy as a moment in the life of a juridical order means that it cannot be understood as expressed in a constitutional regime; on the contrary, it is a democracy that seeks to challenge the established constitutional arrangement and to transform it. 81 . In this sense, the very idea of identifying a determinate constitutional form with democracy's second dimension would be based in a misconception. Unlike democratic governance, democracy at the level of the fundamental laws is a political practice that never coincides with the established laws and institutions. Its exercise can have the purpose of creating new rights or expanding existing ones (or sometimes even limiting them), of changing the structure of governance or founding a new state; it is always in conflict with the liberal idea of containing politics within certain bounds after an act of constitution-making takes place, of a constituent power exhausted after the constitution is in effect. 82 It is a democracy that remains forever It is also interesting to note that while in the context of the several states of the U.S. the popular initiative has been used to adopt amendments that affect the rights of some groups (especially gays and lesbians, as in the recent constitutionalization of heterosexual marriage in California through Proposition 8) it has also been used to make modifications of a progressive nature. So, while in Colorado and Oregon the popular initiative was used in 1992 with the purpose of discriminating against homosexuals it was also used to recognize women's suffrage in the 19 th and 20 th centuries (see David B. Magleby, -Let the Voters Decide?‖ An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process,‖ 66 U. of Colorado L. Rev. 13 (1995) ). 84 See for example Articles 347 and 348 of the Constitution of Venezuela, Article 408 of the Constitution of Bolivia, and Article 444 of the Constitution of Ecuador. These provisions allow citizens trigger the convocation of a constituent assembly of the type described above through the collection of a number of signatures equivalent to 12% to 20% of the registered electors (12% in the case of Ecuador, 15% in the case of Venezuela, and 20% in the case of Bolivia). Interestingly, the set of constitutional reforms recently rejected by the electorate in Venezuela included an amendment that would have increased the number of signatures required from 15% to 30% both in this and in the other type of popular initiative mentioned above.
THE MOMENTS OF DEMOCRACY
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The total reform of the Constitution, or those modifications that affect its fundamental principles, its recognized rights, duties, and guarantees, or the supremacy of the constitution and the process of constitutional reform, will take place through a sovereign Constituent Assembly, activated by popular will through a referendum. The referendum will be triggered by popular initiative, by the signatures of at least twenty percent of the electorate; by the Plurinational Legislative Assembly; or by the President of the State. The Constituent
Assembly will auto-regulate itself in all matters. The entering into force of the reform will require popular ratification through referendum.
85
These kinds of mechanisms have a very uneasy relationship with constitutional forms: as means for the exercise of constituent, rather than constituted power, they always operate against the constitutional regime that contains them. 86 Because they have been recently incorporated into these constitutional systems and have seldom been used, their real effect (in terms of these countries' constitutional practice and quality of democracy) is yet to be seen. 87 However, they are examples of devices of constitutional reform ‗from below' that, by facilitating the exercise of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws 85 Article 408 of the new Bolivian Constitution. The original text reads as follows: -La reforma total de la Constitución, o aquella que afecte a sus bases fundamentales, los derechos, deberes y garantías, o a la primacía y reforma de la Constitución, tendrá lugar a través de una Asamblea Constituyente originaria plenipotenciaria, activada por voluntad popular mediante referendo. La convocatoria del referendo se realizará por iniciativa popular, por la firma de al menos el veinte por ciento del electorado; por la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional; o por la Presidente o el Presidente del Estado. La Asamblea Constituyente se autorregulará a todos los efectos. La entrada en vigencia de la reforma necesitará ratificación popular mediante referendo.‖ 86 This kind of mechanism, although contained in the constitution and in that sense part of the legally constituted order, should be understood as a means to exercise constituent power (at least in those moments in which they are used to radically transform the established constitutional order or to create a new one). Moreover, I maintain this is consistent even with Schmitt's theory of constituent power. What I mean by this is the following. Schmitt argued that constituent power could not be limited by positive law or regulated by any legal procedures; the will of the constituent subject was for him an -unmediated will‖ (Carl Schmitt, supra note 82, p. 132). In other words, no constitution can confer constituent power or prescribe the ways this power is initiated: the constituent subject (the people in a democracy) can (re)determine its form of political existence whenever it decides such an action necessary (ibid.). But while constituent power activates itself through the making of a fundamental political decision, the -further execution and formulation of a political decision reached by the people in an unmediated form requires some organization, a procedure, for which the practice of modern democracy developed certain practices and customs. These are considered below [he goes on to consider (a) the national assembly that drafts and passes constitutional legislation; (b) The assembly that drafts constitutional norms followed by a popular vote or other express confirmation, direct or indirect, of the drafts by the state citizens with the right to vote; (c) constitutional conventions of federal states that are submitted to the people of each state; (d) general popular vote of a proposal or a new order and regulation of indeterminate origins]‖ (ibid., p. 132-134). Otherwise, he suggests, the constituent subject would remain in a state of powerlessness and disorganization, unable to transform its will into law. 87 The exception is Uruguay, which has used the popular initiative to amend the constitution in several occasions, the most recent being in 2004, to include the ‗right to water' in the constitutional text in order to prohibit the privatization of the water sector. In this particular case, after the signatures were presented to the government, the required referendum took place and 64% of the population voted in favour of the proposed amendments (with a participation of 90% of registered voters) ( and that this ‗other' dimension of the democratic ideal fails to be captured by the familiar substantive and procedural conceptions.
CONCLUSIONS
The second dimension democracy is either negated or obscured by the traditional procedural and substantive approaches to democracy and democratic legitimacy. Democracy at the level of the fundamental laws belongs to the political, rather than the juridical terrain; it cannot be limited by principles already sedimented in a constitution and it is not necessarily exercised according to pre- 
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